Exhibit A

1		TATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
2	DIS	FRICT OF DELAWARE	
3	IN RE:	. Chapter 11 . Case No. 23-10207 (TMH)	
4	SL LIQUIDATION, LLC, et al.,	(Jointly Administered)	
5		. Courtroom No. 7	
6	Debtors.	. 824 Market Street	
7	Deptors.	. Wilmington, Delaware 19801	
8		. Friday, March 7, 2025 10:58 a.m.	
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10	TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS M. HORAN		
11	UNITED ST	FATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
12	APPEARANCES:		
13	For John Pinson, Costas		
14	Loukellis, John Arney, Anders Pettersson, Robert	_	
	Remenar, Joseph Ponteri,		
15	and Julian Ameler:	Howard A. Cohen, Esquire FOX ROTHSCHILD, LLP	
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25	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.		
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6	[Filed February 7, 2025; Docket No. 890].	
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(Proceedings commenced at 10:58 a.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: Good morning, please be seated.

MR. COHEN: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Cohen?

MR. COHEN: Good morning.

Howard Cohen, Fox Rothschild; I'm counsel to the movants, who are former directors and officers of Stanadyne, Your Honor.

We are here this morning in connection with my clients' motion for relief from the automatic stay or a plan injunction. The motion, if granted, would allow the carrier, the D&O carrier here, Chubb, to advance defense costs to my clients in connection with the lawsuit brought by them, against them by the liquidating trustee in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

Your Honor, I'm going to be brief in my presentation for two reasons: one, I think my reply brief succinctly sets forth our position, but, two, because I just think the objection fundamentally lacks merit.

Your Honor, I don't believe any facts are in dispute here this morning. Stanadyne purchased the directors and officers policy, insurance policy from Chubb. The post-confirmation trust has brought suit against my clients in the Court of Chancery seeking to recover on account of this

1 | policy.

The D&O insurer Chubb, again, has agreed to advance defense costs. There's no disputes as to coverage here, but Chubb simply asked that my clients simply obtain what it characterized as a "routine comfort order" from this Court. So, again, that's why we're here today.

But, Your Honor, to cut right to the chase, I do believe that the "priority of payments" provision that's set forth in the D&O policy is dispositive here. Your Honor, I'm not an insurance expert; you probably have more familiarity with insurance issues than I do, but again, standard policy, Side A coverage for the benefit of directors and officers. We have Side B, indemnification for the entity, and Side C, typically securities, but this wasn't a public entity. But again, we have a "priority of payments" provision that subordinates Sides B and C to those of the directors and officers under Side A here.

There's not going to be any -- Side B is not going to be implicated in this case. And, again, I'm not aware of any issues with Side C, as well, right. I mean, those, I don't believe there are any claims that could be covered by Side C at this point.

So I do believe, you know, and we cite to the Downey, Judge Sontchi's decision in Downey. We cite to Judge Gross' decision in, I think that was World Health and we have

the <u>Allied Digital</u>. All the precedent in this district comes to the same conclusion when dealing with a "priority of payments" issue.

So, why are we here? We're here because the trust believes that this policy was purchased for its benefit; for the benefit of general unsecured creditors. That's simply not right. This policy was purchased for the benefit of the directors and officers.

The trustee is no different than any other claimant dealing with a wasting policy here. To the extent they are a successor to the debtors here, Your Honor, the debtors weren't permitted to object to relief from the stay. I'm not sure the trust is either, but, in any event, they have objected.

And the irony here is we're wasting more in defense costs under this policy arguing this than we should be; again, this is a routine motion that is, I don't think, litigated all that often and the courts here in Delaware routinely grant the relief sought here. So with that, I'm going to yield the podium and reserve any rights for rebuttal. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Are we introducing any evidence in connection with today's hearing? Are the policies coming into evidence, is the policy coming in?

MR. COHEN: I would -- I have no problem seeking

1 the admission of the D&O policy. I don't know if -- I don't 2 think there's any dispute that the policy we've attached to our reply is the D&O policy, but I'll refer to Mr. Roach to 3 4 see if he has any issues. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, Mr. Roach, and welcome. I had the 6 7 pleasure of admitting to practice pro hac vice this morning. 8 It's good to see you. 9 MR. ROACH: It's nice to see you, Your Honor. 10 For the record, Jared Roach with Reed Smith on behalf of the liquidating trustee who's representing the 11 liquidating trust. And I appreciate, one, quick entry of my 12 pro hac order and, also, the accommodation at the last minute 13 to allow me to appear via Zoom at today's hearing. 14 15 As to the last question that's pending, there is no objection by the liquidating trustee to the trust --16 17 excuse me -- to the policy that is attached as Exhibit A to 18 the reply brief. 19 THE COURT: Okay. So the policy is admitted. 20 (Movants' Exhibit 1 received into evidence) 21 MR. ROACH: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 Again, Jared Roach on behalf of the liquidating

Your Honor, this is not some frivolous objection or something to be taken lightly here. There are courts that

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trustee.

hold that the policy proceeds of this type of policy, a D&O
policy, can be property of the estate. We believe that that
should be the case here. This is a wasting policy, as these
types of policies are and every dollar that is spent
potentially reduces any recovery that the trust may have, if
it's successful, or if there's some other sort of resolution
in Chancery Court.

We're not saying that we need to be elevated above anyone. We don't get anything unless there is some sort of outcome that would favor the trust or be agreeable to the trust.

There's not -- this also isn't a "zero to sum" game, as counsel suggests, but it's a winner and a loser. Courts do fashion, the burden is fashioned that there can be use of the proceeds both, by in this case -- in the Chancery Court action by the Defendants and the Movants, here in the Bankruptcy Court action, and my client, as well, which, as a backdrop, we think would be the proper outcome here.

Counsel spends time in the reply brief arguing that the trust talks about all the harm that it will suffer by not having access to the policy or proceeds thereof, specifically, but also, that the Movants will suffer prejudice. Well, that's an easy way to solve that. The Movants can have access to some of the funds now. It's a (indiscernible) policy, (indiscernible) should have been

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covered later on, and so --
 1
 2
          (Recess taken at 11:04 a.m.)
 3
          (Proceedings resumed at 11:11 a.m.)
               THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the record.
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 5
               Mr. Roach, can you hear me?
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               MR. ROACH: I can hear you.
 7
               Can you hear me, Your Honor?
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               THE COURT: Yes, I can.
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               That may have been a Zoom problem. One of the
    many risks of attempting oral argument by Zoom, but we're
10
11
    glad to have you back.
12
               Restart wherever you'd like to. I'm interested in
13
    your entire presentation, so...
               MR. ROACH: Your Honor, again, Jared Roach with
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15
   Reed Smith; here, for the trust.
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               Did Your Honor hear the -- well, I would start by
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    saying it's not a "zero to sum" game, that is, where either
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   my client is successful and there is no access to the policy
19
    or the Movants are successful and they have complete access
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    to the policy, due to potential detriment of the trust here.
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    There is -- the Court can fashion a remedy and the Court in
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    Minnesota has done so in a case where it gave some access to
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   the Movants to allow them to cover defense costs, as the
24
   Movants here request, while also preserving part of the
25
   policy that should be, in this case, the trust, be successful
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in the Chancery Court action, that there's a known recovery, which again, benefits unsecured creditors, here, the trust, who brings this action on behalf of the unsecured creditors or for the distribution of unsecured creditors. Any money that comes into the estate certainly is paid out, pursuant to the trust agreement, which predominantly is for the unsecured creditors here.

So, yes, I would agree with counsel, Mr. Cohen, that there are -- the facts are not in dispute here, you know, and the comfort order is necessary. We think that to the extent that this is property of the estate and they are seeking relief from stay, they need to meet their burden here and that the trust should be protected from preservation of at least part of the policy.

This is a unique case. These are not necessarily run-of-the-mill because the very parties that are bringing the litigation here also stand to benefit from the policy and need to be protected.

So, with that, Your Honor, I would yield the podium, unless Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: Well, okay, I mean, there are two issues here. The first issue is whether the policy are -the proceeds of the policy are property of the estate. You have a little bit of argument on that in your objection and refer to a batch of cases from other districts, but it

strikes me that we have cases that are fairly squarely on point in this district and how would you distinguish this from, for instance, Downey, which I think is really just about as on all fours with this policy and these facts as you could possibly be. How would you distinguish that?

MR. ROACH: Your Honor, I rely, candidly, on the fact that there needs to be some preservation and, you know, I don't dispute what Judge Sontchi said in the opinion, but, certainly, we can look to fashion a remedy here that would protect the trust and beneficiaries of the trust.

THE COURT: Okay. And the second issue is, even if I were to find that the proceeds of the policy are not property of the estate, under the policy, the debtor would have been, agreed not to oppose, precisely, this sort of relief that the Movants are seeking today, doesn't the debtors' agreement bind the liquidating trust?

MR. ROACH: Your Honor, it did pass to the trust; that's a correct statement. We think there's still an overarching benefit and obligation and equity to protect in the trust here, in the interest that the trust has in it.

THE COURT: But the issue here is really about contracts. I'm not sure that equitable principles can be invoked to -- well, I guess, to undermine the contract and, you know, I think I just have to read the contract, in other words.

MR. ROACH: Understood, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Cohen, any response? 3 MR. COHEN: I will be very brief, Your Honor. This case is not unique; it's routine, it's 4 5 common, it's no different than the other case, cases such as 6 Downey, that have been brought here in this district. I just 7 think there's a fundamental misunderstanding about whose benefit this D&O policy was purchased for. It was purchased 8 for my clients' benefits, not for the trust's benefit. 9 10 And, yes, the trust has stepped into the shoes of the debtor. It has no greater rights under the contract than 11 the debtor possessed. So I think it's crystal clear; relief 12 should be granted. And I don't believe that it's appropriate 13 to fashion some sort of remedy. I'm not sure what remedy 14 15 Mr. Roach is looking for, but I don't think it's appropriate 16 to fashion a remedy that limits my clients' access to the 17 proceeds. Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 19 I am ready to rule on this. Well, no. 20 Mr. Cohen, I have a question for you. 21 MR. COHEN: Yes? 22 THE COURT: The relief that you're requesting in 23 the motion differs, I think, meaningfully from the proposed relief that I would grant under the proposed order. In the 24 25 motion, the Movants seem to be asking that I find that the

policy, the proceeds of the policy are not property of the estate. The proposed order doesn't address that issue.

What are we asking for?

MR. COHEN: We are asking for the same order that's routinely entered in this district that allows Chubb to advance to my clients', its defense cost under the D&O policy.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's my ruling.

The proceeds of the policy are not property of the debtors' estate and I do find this case to be very similar to Downey and, really, pretty much identical in all the meaningful respects. The, what we'll call, it's not called it in the policy, but the Side A coverage issue and the "priority of payment" provisions make clear that the insurer has an obligation under that policy to pay the non-indemnified fees of the Movants in connection with responding to the complaint.

And that's exactly the situation that they're in and that's precisely what they're asking for. There's no question they're not being indemnified.

And the purpose of the policy is to address exactly this issue where the Ds and Os get sued and based upon the policy language, it's clear to me that the rights of the Movants here, as directors and officers, are primary when it comes to the right of payment.

And, you know, were I to find that in any wasting policy that the Ds and Os would have no right to payment or that the policy, therefore, is property of the estate, it would undermine the bargain that the debtor and the directors and officers entered into in, first of all, agreeing for them to serve in those particular roles within the company, but also undermine the agreement that they made with the insurers as to what the insurers' obligations are under such policies.

So, I do find that the policy or the proceeds of the policy, rather, are not property of the estate and the Movants can proceed to obtain the coverage that's bargained for under the policy; however, even if I were incorrect about that and found that the proceeds of the policy were property of the estate, the liquidating trustee does not have the contractual right to contest the relief that we're seeking.

And there's an endorsement to the policy -- I'm just checking, but I believe it's endorsement 6 -- that provides that the insured or, rather, the organization is the defined term under the policy. In that case, it's the debtor. The debtor is agreeing not to oppose or object to any efforts by the company, meaning the insurer; the organization, meaning the debtor or any insured person, in this case, Movants, to obtain relief from any stay or injunction.

And the liquidating trustee, as I understand it,

has received an assignment of the debtors' rights and obligations under the policy and, therefore, they are bound by endorsement 6 to the policy, which precludes them from objecting to this relief. So, on that basis, I would also find that the Movants would be entitled to relief from the automatic stay.

And then, even getting past that, I would find that there is ample cause from tort relief from the automatic stay. It is — the policy is the bargain that the directors and officers struck. The prejudice to them would far outweigh any prejudice to the estate. They would be required to defend an action in which it hasn't been decided yet, but they may or may not be liable — that's something for the Chancery Court to decide — but they would be forced to incur the defense costs out-of-pocket.

The prejudice to the estate, if stay relief were not granted, would simply be that they would have to live with the terms of the policy that binds the estate.

And were I to consider the third factor, which is likelihood of success on the merits, I do find that would be neutral here. I really don't have any basis upon which to understand the merits of the underlying proceeding in Chancery Court. I know that there's been a complaint. There's been a motion to dismiss. But to my knowledge, there's been nothing else. So, for all of those reasons, I

1 would grant relief from the automatic stay if I did find that 2 the proceeds of the policy were not estate property, but to 3 be clear, I do find that they are not. 4 To properly record the ruling of this Court and to 5 make sure that the record is clear, I would ask that the 6 parties agree upon a revised form of order and to submit that 7 under certification of counsel and I will enter that 8 promptly. 9 MR. COHEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROACH: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. You're welcome, sir. 13 Anything else for today? MR. COHEN: Nothing, Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 16 Well, and thank you all for your appearance. And 17 it sounds like it was a last-minute thing for you, Mr. Roach, 18 to have to do this argument this morning, so I appreciate you 19 doing so. 20 MR. ROACH: Thank you, again, for the accommodations, Your Honor; it's greatly appreciated. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I was very happy to have 23 you here and I hope to see you again here. 24 MR. ROACH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Roach.

25

CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability. /s/ William J. Garling March 11, 2025 William J. Garling, CET-543 Certified Court Transcriptionist For Reliable